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The path to a permanent contract often implies a sequence of temporary jobs, multi-firms 
experiences and unemployment spells. This paper investigates whether the characteristics of the 
path may influence the chances to get a permanent contract and the duration itself at the non-
permanent state. We estimate a simple hazard model with unobserved heterogeneity to examine 
the average duration at the non-permanent position needed to get a permanent one, either in the 
same or in other firm. The analysis considers two different groups of workers specially affected 
by temporary contracts. These are the young workers who just enter into the labor market, and 
the long term unemployed. We find evidence of the existence of the temporality trap. The 
probability of accessing into a permanent contract is non linearly related to the duration at the 
non-permanent state. It starts increasing but once it reaches a maximum it drops to pretty low 
levels. Besides, repeated temporary contracts and job interruptions reduce it while multi-firms 
experiences seem do not affect it negatively.  
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I Introduction   
Recent labour market reforms aimed at reducing the presence of temporary contracts carried out 
by several European countries raised the issue of whether temporary contracts effectively help 
to improve the performance of the labour market and particularly, whether they positively affect 
workers labour career. Moreover, during the last years, the successive EU Directives for 
employment,  have repeatedly urged the social speakers to negotiate agreements that guarantee 
increases in the productivity and in the competitiveness at the same time that they assures "the 
necessary balance between flexibility and stability".  
From a theoretical point of view, workers have essentially two opposing ways of considering 
temporary contacts. They can view them as a springboard towards more stable positions (Booth, 
Francesconi and Frank, 2002; Varejao and Portugal, 2002). The idea is that these contracts offer 
them the opportunity to acquire the labour market experience necessary to join on the labour 
market. Secondly, workers can consider them as a permanent condition not necessarily ending 
into a permanent job. Obviously, this second case represents a valid alternative only when 
compensates the uncertainty intrinsic to temporary contracts by offering a higher wage. 
However, the empirical experience at hand indicates that temporary contracts might give rise to 
disadvantageous situations for workers since they are also associated to labour precariousness 
and low qualification paid jobs (Farber, 1999; Araulampalan and Booth, 1998). For instance, De 
la Rica (2004) and García Pérez and Rebollo (2005) put forward the existence of wage penalties 
associated with temporary employment in Spain. Besides, the experience has revealed that the 
probability of getting a permanent contract from a non-permanent position is not equal among 
different types of workers and the negative effects of these contracts are suffered for certain 
type of workers. Hence, temporary contracts might foster the segmentation of the labour market 
and create a dual labour market formed by a primary sector -consisted of workers with high 
social protection and good labour expectations-, and a secondary sector - characterized by 
workers submitted to the precariousness in social protection and employment (Jimeno and 
Thoaria, 1993). 
Nevertheless, the majority of the previous empirical analysis has restricted the analysis of the 
transition rate from temporary to a permanent contract to a single temporary contract. However, 
as the empirical evidence tells us, the path to a permanent contract often implies a sequence of 
temporary contracts and job interruptions. For instance, young workers may need more than just 
one temporary contract to acquire the experience needed to be promoted to a permanent 
employment. In this type of situations, it is more relevant to refer to temporary careers instead 
of temporary jobs. The analysis of a single temporary contract does not capture the fact that the 
characteristics of the labour trajectory may influence the changes to get a permanent contract 
and the duration itself of the temporary career.  
This paper studies the role of temporary contracts on workers labour path for the Spanish 
economy. Spain is an interesting extreme example where temporary work is far higher than 
elsewhere in EU, despite several reforms attempting to reduce employment protection 







  - 3 - 
permanent contract considering the previous labour path of the individual. We estimate a single 
risk model in which the worker faces the alternative of remaining in the same situation 
characterized by the absence of a permanent contract, -non-permanent position-, or to move to 
permanent job. The empirical analysis takes information from the Social Security records for the 
period 1995-2004. This database gathers the whole labour path of the workers during the 
mentioned period and avoids the problems of aggregation of different periods of employment, 
generally throughout one quarter or year, existing in other databases. On the other hand, the 
analysed period turns out to be especially relevant since in the years 1997 and 2001 important 
labour market reforms directed to reducing the presence of the temporary contracts have been 
implemented in Spain.  
Our main findings are as follows. Firstly, we find evidence of the temporality trap in Spain 
since the duration dependence of the exit rate is non-linear: it starts increasing but at a certain 
point in time turns down to pretty low levels. For the average worker, the exit rate reaches a 
maximum after being, at least, four years in this position. Secondly, the incidence of temporary 
contracts depends on observed and unobserved characteristics: for women - except the young 
ones-, mature workers, immigrants, part-time workers, those employed at the construction 
temporary contracts can suppose a trap towards labour instability instead of leading them to 
stable jobs. Besides, for certain type of workers -around 44% for labor market entrants and 40% 
for long term unemployed-, and independently of their observed characteristics, temporary 
contracts strongly reduce their possibility of acceding to a permanent one. This probability is 
already lower for short durations at the non-permanent position. Thirdly, the probability of 
accessing to a permanent contract diminishes notably with multi-contract and job interruptions 
whereas it increases with multi-firm experiences. For instance, the probability of getting a 
permanent contract is significantly lower if the worker has a temporary contract of two years 
opposite to having six temporary contracts of four months of duration each. We consider that 
these results show an important characteristic of the hiring decision of Spanish firms: a high 
percentage of temporary contracts are used to fill "permanent" positions.  
The organization of the paper is the following one. First, in order to frame the state of the 
question, in Section 2 we comment the most relevant empirical studies related to the problem of 
temporality.  In the following Section we describe the methodology applied to the study of the 
temporality. In Section 4 we offer some basics statistics about the evolution of the temporary 
employment in Spain. Our principal results of the estimations appear in Section 5. Finally in 
Section 6 we present a summary of the results and our preliminary conclusions. 
II  Previous Empirical Studies  
Since the 1980s, when temporary contracts emerged in several European countries as an 
instrument to increase labour market flexibility, there has been a significant and ever-growing 
literature on temporary contracts and their implications for the performance of the labor market. 
Given that these effects have not always been as expected, this issue is nowadays an object of 
debate in several European countries. Initially, the majority of the studies showed up the 
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second important issue is the impact of temporary contracts on workers labour career. For 
certain workers a temporary contract may suppose an intermediate suitable stage to get better 
employment perspectives whereas for another type of workers it does not have the desired effect 
and it positions them in situations of labour market instability. So far, existing theory provides 
contradictory answers to the impact of multi-temporary contracts, multi-firm experiences and 
job interruptions into the path to permanent employment. This lack of answer is also resembled 
in the empirical work. In this section we comment the most relevant studies that focus on these 
items for the European labour markets in general and for the Spanish labour market in 
particular. 
Several studies that focus on the Spanish situation are Amuedo-Dorantes (2000), Güell and 
Petrongolo (2004), Casquel and Cunyat (2005) and García-Serrano (2004)
1. Except the last one, 
they all use competing risk models to study the transition rate from a –single- temporary to a 
permanent contract. In the first case, the authors conclude that temporary contracts are more a 
trap than a way towards labour stability whereas the second one suggests that they have two 
principal uses since the conversion rate to a permanent contract depends on job tenure. This rate 
is higher for short (1 year) and long (3 years) durations. From these results they conclude that in 
some cases, firms exhaust the maximum legal duration of the temporary contract before 
transforming it into a permanent one. On the contrary, in other cases the temporary contract 
fulfils one of its fundamental functions since it serves as a screening device to find the best 
match. Casquel and Cunyat (2005) indicate that only observed workers characteristics are 
fundamental to explain the effect of a labour contract on her labour career. For some workers, 
these contracts are positive since they are the way to access to better labour market positions 
whereas for others, they reduce the possibility of obtaining stable jobs. For instance, young 
men, women and low skill workers tend to get trapped. So as to test whether firms use 
temporary contracts to improve their knowledge about the worker, they study whether the 
existence of unobservable characteristics influences the transition rate to a permanent 
employment and conclude that in Spain temporary contracts do not play this role. 
From a different perspective, García-Serrano (2004) analyses whether workers with temporary 
contracts occupy precarious jobs what induces them to have a high employment exit rate. He 
takes the information from the living and working conditions database (Encuesta de Calidad de 
Vida en el Trabajo) of the year 2001 and constructs a series of individual indicators relative to 
the living and working conditions. The author obtains that, still controlling by characteristics of 
the individuals and companies, workers with temporary contracts have jobs with worse labour 
conditions and face a greater employment exit rate, especially those with tenure lower than 18 
months. He also finds that the differences between workers with permanent and temporary 
contracts with tenure superior to 42 months are low. Therefore, he concludes that workers with 
temporary contracts occupy jobs that have similar characteristic to ones of the workers with 
                                           
1 Among the earlier studies focused on the Spanish labour market we can find those of Thoaria (1996) and Alba-
Ramírez (1998). They study the exit rate to a temporary employment using the data provided by the Survey of Active 
Population (EPA). They observe that this rate depends on the characteristics of the worker and the job. Specifically, 
Alba-Ramírez (1998) finds evidence in favour of the existence of a dual labour market where the worse qualified 
workers have a major probability of remaining in temporary contracts in the long term. On the other hand, he 
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permanent contracts. Consequently, he points out that Spanish firms use temporary contracts in 
permanent tasks so as to reduce total labour costs. 
There also are several studies that cover the same topic but analysis other European countries.  
All these studies consider the exit rate of temporary employment from a duration model with 
one or several risks in competition. For instance, D´Addio and Rosholm (2005) follow the last 
approach and use the European Community Household Panel (1995-1999). They find that the 
duration dependence of the exit rate from a temporary to a permanent contract is positive for 
women whereas for men it decreases after two years. But, Spain turns out to be an exception: 
the greater the duration of the temporary contract the higher the probability of undergoing into 
the temporality trap
2. They also find evidence of the positive relation between low quality and 
low paid jobs, unemployment experiences and temporary contracts for workers with low labour 
qualification and women with children. On account of which, the authors state that when 
temporary jobs are occupied by workers with low skills, they are not a good mechanism to 
improve the labour position of the worker and on the contrary, they reduce the chances of 
finding a stable job.  
Booth, Francesconi and Frank (2001, 2002), Zijl, Van Den Berg and Heyma (2004) and 
Gagliarducci (2005) examine whether temporary contracts lead workers towards stable positions 
or on the contrary, they damage their labour career in Great Britain, Holland and Italy, 
respectively. Booth, Francesconi and Frank (2001, 2002) get that temporary contracts favour the 
access to permanent ones though workers have to stay in temporary contracts between 18 to 40 
months. This strong variability depends on the type of temporary contract hold by the worker 
and it is larger for seasonal contracts. Zijl, Van Den Berg and Heyma (2004)
3 conclude that 
temporary contracts favour the access of unemployed workers to permanent contracts since the 
probability of finding an indefinite contract during the first six months is 20% for the 
unemployed ones and 80% for the temporary contracted ones
4. However, the transitions from 
unemployment to permanent contracts are more common that the transitions from temporary to 
permanent ones. Therefore, these authors also conclude that temporary contracts do not play an 
important role in the access to a stable employment for Dutch unemployed workers. 
Gagliarducci (2005)
5 finds that the duration dependence of the exit rate to a permanent contract 
is not linear. In terms of matching models this implies that good matches become permanent 
contracts quickly, after the first contact, whereas for long contracts, the probability first 
increases but it falls soon. He also obtains that the probability of acceding to a permanent 
contract drops with the number of contracts
6. Therefore, he concludes that job interruptions, 
instead of temporary, contracts, are the sources of the deteroriation of the labor market career of 
                                           
2 In this paper, long-term temporary contracts are over-represented since it is not possible to identify labour 
transitions along one year.   
3 This paper faces the same limitation as the D´Addio y Rosholm (2004) because it does not have available labor 
market transitions along a year.  
4 These authors apply the timing of events approach (Van den Berg, Holm y Van Ours, 2002) and estimate a mixed 
exit rate model with repeated observations. It is interesting to emphasize that the unobserved heterogeneity is specific 
at each state and type of transition.  
5 He uses the European Community Household Panel and proposes a risk competition model with repeated 
observations and unobserved heterogeneity. 
6 When a worker reaches his second temporary job, the probability of acceding to a permanent contract begins to fall, 
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workers in non-permanent positions. For this reason, the author considers that the reforms must 
go directed not as much to the temporary contract per se but to guarantee the continuity of the 
spell of employment after the temporary contract. 
Van Ours (2004) studies whether to subsidize temporary contracts help the unemployed workers 
to find a stable job. The author finds that the exit rate from a temporary employment to a 
permanent one decreases with the duration. This is due to the drop in the worker´s intensity job 
search and therefore, in the middle and long term these workers get trapped into a non-
permanent position. From the point of view of the economic policy, he recommends subsidies to 
short term temporary contracts. 
III  The Econometric Approach  
Given that the database offers the duration of the spells of employment and unemployment on a 
monthly base the appropriate approach is to study the exit rate from a temporary contract as a 
discreet duration model. Moreover discreet time duration models allow specifying with enough 
flexibility the time dependence characteristics of the exit rate, as well as to incorporate in the 
analysis explanatory variables with temporary variability (Alison 1982). In addition, discreet 
duration models put in evidence the narrow existing correspondence between duration and 
discreet choice models. 
As it is traditional in the literature of duration models the objective function is to estimate the 
exit rate h (t).  For each individual i we observe the duration in a determined state from t=1 up 
to k-month in which the individual changes of situation (ci=1) or remains in the same state 
(ci=0). Combining the information relative to the censored and uncensored observations, the 
likelihood function to be maximized is standard: 
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A common alternative to estimate the exit rate consists of transforming the duration model in a 
sequence of discreet choice equations defined on the surviving population at each duration. In 
this case, the form of the likelihood function has exactly the same form that the likelihood 
function of a discreet choice model once we have rearranged the database so there are so many 
rows by individual as time intervals -months in this case-, in which the worker has remained in 
the initial situation (Allison, 1982; Jenkins, 1995). The corresponding probability term of the 
likelihood function when we estimate the duration model as a binary discreet choice model is: 
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In the previous specification of the likelihood function we have assumed that all the 
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unobserved characteristics such as the individual’s preference for leisure or individual’s ability 
constitute a factor of heterogeneity in the exit rate among observations. As it has been 
extensively shown in the literature, the existence of unobserved heterogeneity in duration 
models might give rise to spurious duration dependence and bias the estimated coefficients
7. In 
relation to the temporary exit rate, the unobserved heterogeneity might miss-specify the duration 
dependence term. For instance, if more motivated workers find a permanent employment more 
quickly, the share of workers who remain in the temporary situation might grow along time.  
We follow the approach proposed by Heckman and Singer to specify the unobserved 
heterogeneity term. We assume that each exit rate has two support points. Besides, we allowed 
two types of individuals, so that each type is characterized by a unique set of points of support 
and the corresponding probability, πm. The points of support and the associated probabilities are 
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where ν represents the unobserved heterogeneity term, m represents the points of support and πm 
the corresponding probabilities. Given this specification, our econometric approach is to 
estimate a logit model with unobserved heterogeneity.   
IV Data  Description 
We use a sample drawn from the Social Security records of the Spanish economy during the 
period 1995-2004. The starting year is 1995 because the available information relative to the 
type of contract is scant in previous years. This data base has not been used previously to 
analyze the temporality issue in the Spanish economy although the Social Security records offer 
detailed information on the labour market history of the individual. Other databases only gather 
annual or quarterly information and therefore the individual labour market transitions within a 
year are not available giving rise to an under-representation of short term temporary contracts. 
This last matter is relevant when the aim of the study is to analyse the incidence of the 
temporary contracts on the high rate of job turnover that characterised the Spanish economy.  
This administrative dataset gathers much information about the worker’s labour market 
                                           
7 In general terms, the unobserved heterogeneity component allows controlling for specification problems as the 
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trajectory and individual characteristics such as age, gender, occupation, unemployment and 
employment spells and their durations. We have available the reasons to the end of the contract, 
the location of the firm, the sector of activity, type of contract and whether the contract was 
signed with a temporary help agency for each spell of employment. The duration of the 
unemployment and employment spells are built from the dates of the hiring and the end of the 
contract and it is measured in months. In the analysis we also consider several aggregate 
variables at the regional and national level to control for the labour market situation and the 
business cycle. Basically we use the growth rate of the domestic product and the regional 
unemployment rate.  
Temporary employment has a number of different meanings. Some temporary work is, by its 
nature, seasonal or causal. For other jobs, where the work itself does not dictate temporary 
employment, the job is temporary due to a characteristic of the contract itself under which the 
worker is hired, namely its fixed-term duration. Therefore, the definition of a temporary contract 
is a relevant issue. Guell and Petrongolo (2004) and Booth, Francesconni and Frank (2001, 
2002) use a broad definition of a temporary contract
8. Throughout this research,  we follow the 
same approach and within the concept of temporary contract we include the following 
categories: fixed term, specific task, training, contract for circumstances of production, 
internship contract and replacement.  
From the initial database we omit all workers younger than 18 years old and older than 55 years 
old. We select workers who have one temporary contract, at least. The selected workers are then 
followed until they get their first indefinite contract and then they are removed from the sample. 
Therefore, the sample consists of spells of temporary contracts that can end up into one of the 
following states: permanent contract, other temporary contract and non-employment.  
IV.a  Main Characteristics of the Spanish Temporary Employment 
We start off displaying in Table 1 the different options a worker faces after the temporary 
contract. The worker moves to unemployment in approximately 50% of the cases, whereas only 
in approximately 8% of the cases he improves its position and obtains a permanent contract. 
Workers move again to a temporary contract, either in the same or in another firm in the 40% of 
the transitions. This result seems enough stable along the period 1995-2004 and it shows that 
the probability of getting a permanent contract is pretty low in Spain. We observe greater 
variability in the probability of changing firm, either with a temporary or a permanent contract. 
The data show that the probability of connecting temporary contracts and the transition from 
temporary to permanent contracts within the same firm have tended to increase. Thus, whereas 
in 1996, around 15% of new permanent contracts and 24% of new temporary contracts were 
signed in the same company, in the year 2003 these shares rise to 30% and 39% respectively.  
We show in Table 2 the relation between the duration of the temporary contract and the type of 
transition. We obtain that short term contracts tend to end into unemployment while longer term 
ones end into permanent ones. Moreover, we can observe that the average duration of temporary 
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contracts is pretty short since 53% of them lasted three months and 22% between three and six 
months.  
1  Table 1: Transitions From a Temporary Contract  
  P.C. T.C  U 
  Total  Equal 
Employer  Total  Equal 
Employer  Total  Equal 
Employer 
Media 1995-2004  8%  25%  40%  36%  52%  - 
1996 11%  15%  32%  24%  57%  - 
2000 9%  27%  41%  37%  50%  - 
2003 5%  30%  43%  39%  52%  - 
P.C = Permanent Contract; T.C = Temporary Contract; U=Unemployment 
2  Table 2: Type of transitions and its relation with the duration of the temporary contract   
  Total P.C.  T.C  U 
   Total  Equal 
Employer   Total  Equal 
Employer  Total  Equal 
Employer 
< 3 Months  53%  4%  40%  42%  55%  53%  - 
3-6 Months  22%  8%  63%  40%  50%  51%  - 
6-12 Months  14%  10%  59%  38%  46%  52%  - 
12-24 Months  7%  15%  52%  43%  38%  41%  - 
> 24 Months  3%  19%  43%  42%  36%  38%  - 
P.C = Permanent Contract; T.C = Temporary Contract; U=Unemployment 
 
We display in Graph 1 the empirical exit rates from a temporary contract to each of the 
destination states considered. Firstly, we observe negative duration dependence when the 
destinations are the unemployment and other temporal contract. Interestingly, the exit rate to a 
permanent contract hardly varies except at certain durations and it reaches a local maximum at 
duration 36.     
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IV.b  Main Characteristics for young and long term unemployed workers. 
The database suffers from the common problem of left censored information since the worker 
may have experienced several labour transitions before 1995. Since this might influence the 
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workers whose first observation matches with their entrance at the labor market (labor market 
entrants from now on) and the other one formed by long term unemployed workers. Once a 
worker is selected, she is followed until her first indefinite contract. This type of analysis allows 
checking whether the incidence of temporary contracts differs between workers with different 
labour market histories. In order to build the sample of labour market entrants we select those 
workers whose first observation in the social security records is with a temporary contract and 
they are younger than 27 years old. In the case of long term unemployed we keep those workers 
who have been unemployed for at least twelve months and enter into the labour market with a 
temporary contract.  
Given this sample selection criteria we have available 44,034 spells for young workers and 
80,468 spells for long-term unemployed. As Table 2 illustrates, there are some interesting 
differences between both samples. Firstly, the share of workers who get directly a permanent 
contract is much larger for long term unemployed workers. This ratio is 42% while for young 
workers is only 15%. Secondly, young workers face a larger probability of having an indefinite 
contract after a temporary contract experience. This probability is 58% for young workers 
instead of 42% as it happens to be for long term unemployed workers. Therefore, temporary 
contracts as an intermediate step to get into stable jobs seem to be a more common option for 
young workers.  
We display in Table 3 some basic characteristics of the workers labor path for both samples. 
The results show that workers who obtain a permanent employment are, in average, between 18-
19 months in a non-permanent position in the labour market, the average duration of their 
temporary contracts is 6 months, they do not undergo many unemployment experiences and 
tend to remain in the same firm. Those who do not accede to a permanent job seem to have a 
worse position in the labor market. In average, they have been more than 38 moths without a 
permanent contract; they have passed through 4 temporary contracts and at least one 
unemployment experience. In fact, some seem to have entered into the temporality trap, since 
around 25% have accumulated 7 temporary contracts, two firms movements and two 
unemployment spells.  
3  Table 3: The presence of Temporary Contracts to get into a Permanent Job 
  No P. C.  P. C. after T. C  P.C directly  
Young Workers  60% 24%  15% 
Long Term Unemployed Workers  44% 12%  42% 
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4  Table 4: Main Characteristics of the Temporary Career   
  No P.C    P. C.   
Young Workers  P25  P75  Average P25  P75  Average 
Duration in a Non Permanent Position    16  50  31  6  25  20 
Nº of Unemployment Spells  1  4  2  0  2  1 
Nº T. C.   2  8  5  1  5  3 
Nº of Firms  0  1 1 0  1  1 
Long Term Unemployed Workers  P25  P75  Average P25  P75  Average 
Duration in a Non Permanent Position    15  53  32  7  28  15 
Nº of Unemployment Spells  0  3  2  0  1  0 
Nº T. C.   2  6  5  1  4  2 
Nº of Firms  0  1  1  0  1  0 
  Note: P25 and P75 represent percentile 25 and 75 respectively.  
 
In Figure 2 we display the empirical exit rate from the non-permanent situation for young and 
long term unemployed workers. Firstly, it stands out the large average duration in the non-
permanent position and evidences the existence of the temporality trap since the probability of 
accessing to a permanent contract decreases with the duration at the non-permanent state. 
Secondly, this rate is always higher for labour market entrants and this difference increases with 
the duration. In the case of labour market entrants the exit rate starts decreasing after 24 months  
whereas this rate starts decreasing from the fist month when for the group of long term 
unemployed. Thirdly, in both cases, the exit rate reaches local maximums at certain durations.  
Nevertheless, we can not get any final conclusion since this empirical exit rate is an 
unconditional analysis that can be biased by selection effects.  
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The labour market experience of the worker is evidently an important variable to explain the 
transition rate to a permanent contract. In our analysis we use the age cohort, measured at the 
time of the entrance of the labor market, as an indicator of the previous labour market 
experience. We divide each sub-sample by the following age cohorts: 18-21, 23-24 and 24-26 
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fact, the statistics showed in Table 4 points out significant differences in the transition rate to a 
permanent position among workers located in different age cohorts. The average duration at the 
non-permanent state increases with the age. The same result is found for the average duration of 
temporary contracts. On the contrary, the number of temporary contracts and job interruptions 
tend to decrease with the age.  
5  Table 5: Some Basic Statistics by Age Cohort 
  T. C. 
(Months) 
Non-Permanent  
State (Months)  Nº of T. C.  Nº of U.  Spells 
Young Workers       
Age:18-20 7.0  17.3  3.6  1.7 
Age:21-23 7.6  18.8  3.5  1.6 
Age:24-26 8.0  18.6  3.3  1.4 
Long Term Unemployed       
Age:27-30 8.2  19.2  3.3  1.3 
Age:31-35 8.7  19.9  3.3  1.3 
Age:36-40 8.4  19.5  3.2  1.3 
Age:41-45 8.7  20.3  3.3  1.4 
Age:46-50 9.7  18.3  2.6  1.1 
V  The Determinants of the Exit Rate from an Unstable Labor Position  
The main question to be answered in this sector is how long does it take to find a stable position 
and what are the main determinants of this process?. The empirical evidence shows that the 
conversion rate from temporary to permanent employment is low in Spain. This might mean 
that temporary contracts do not favour stable positions or that the workers need several 
temporary contracts before they accede to a permanent one. The statistics displayed also show 
that both situations might simultaneously happen. Therefore, to test whether the large average 
duration in the non-permanent position can be related to the need to accumulate human capital 
skills or it effectively leads to the temporality trap we need to estimate the duration dependence 
of the exit rate once we control for all the observed and unobserved heterogeneity and to 
evaluate the effect of multi-firm and multi-contract experiences and job interruptions into the 
exit rate from the non-permanent state
9. The way these variables are related to the exit rate from 
a non-permanent position is not clear cut.  
Firstly, the matching approach states that when firms use temporary contracts as a screening 
device to identify the best match, then workers will need few temporary contracts to get a 
permanent position. Besides, the exit rate from a temporary contract should decrease as the time 
pass by. On the other hand, if firms use them to fill permanent positions, the worker will 
probability passes through many temporary contracts of longer duration –and firms- and she 
will face a low transition rate to a permanent contract. Secondly, human capital models point 
out that the accumulation of temporary contracts and firms favours the accumulation of general 
human capital (and specific if it is in the same firm), and consequently, it increases the 
probability of conquering a permanent contract, whereas unemployment experiences reduce it. 
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These models also point to a positive duration dependence of the exit rate from a temporary to a 
permanent contract since worker’s productivity
10 increases with its duration. Thirdly, search 
models state that search intensity decreases with the duration of the temporary contract and 
therefore the exit rate should fall as time pass by. Finally, institutional factors must be also 
considered. Concretely, in labour markets characterised by excess of labour supply it is possible 
that the firm converts temporary contracts into permanent ones when the legal limit is reached. 
In this case one would find that the exit rate reaches the maximum at certain contracts durations 
depending on the legal environment. 
Our empirical model considers those variables available in our database that control for worker 
and job heterogeneity. Mainly, age, gender, nationality, wage category, whether the contract is 
with a temporary help agency, hours of work, and firm activity sector. We also include some 
aggregate variables such as the regional output and the regional unemployment rate to control 
for regional and cyclical variability.  
In this model the duration term gathers all the spells of temporary employment and 
unemployment previous to a permanent contract. The type of the duration dependence might 
help to understand the role of temporary contracts in the Spanish labour market.  Thus, this 
variable is specified as a quadratic function to capture non-linearities
11. In order to gain 
flexibility in the specification of the duration dependence and to control for the role of 
institutional factor we also include several dummy variables that describe some specifics points 
in time: 6,12,24,36 and 42. The first spikes are meant to capture short-run effects, while the 
longer ones were introduced to capture longer renewal dynamics for temporary workers which 
can be related to institutional factors, among other things.  
Since we want to test whether the type of the labour path influences the exit rate to a permanent 
contract our model contains the following time dummy variables: the number of temporary 
contracts and unemployment spells previous to last observed worker spell. This last spell will be 
a permanent contract for the case of uncensored observations and a spell of unemployment or 
temporary contract for censored observations. These variables are modelled as dummy variables 
because this specification allows quantifying the marginal effect of each new spell into the exit 
rate to a permanent employment. Besides, we also use multi-firm experiences in the model in 
order to distinguish among internal or external markets. The idea is that firms can hire their 
temporary workers after a certain number of experiences in the same company or proceeding 
from outside. Finally, we also consider the duration of the unemployment spells. We expect that 
workers with one unemployment spell will have a lower probability of getting into a permanent 
contract the larger is its duration.  
The employment variables refer to the last job. The variable "changes in the wage level" seeks 
to capture changes in worker's qualification. Finally, we include dummy variables that specify 
the age cohorts the individual belongs at the moment of entering into the social security records. 
In the sample of young workers this corresponds with the age of entrance in the labour market. 
                                           
10 This rise in worker productivity might be related to the accumulation of human capital and/or to on-the-job 
training.  
11 We have also estimated the model with seven dummy variables that gather the following time intervals measured 
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We expect that the sooner the entrance of the labour market, the lower the probability of 
entering into the temporality trap and the higher the number of temporary contracts needed to 
get a permanent position. Besides, we relate these dummy variables with the duration term
12 to 
check whether the duration dependence depends on the cohort. Since age approaches workers 
labour market experience, it is probable that the average duration in the non-permanent state 
varies in relation to the age cohort. Again we expect the average duration in the non-permanent 
state will be larger for younger workers. Besides, to control for aggregate effects, we create 
dummy variables for the year of entrance in the Social Security records. 
The results of estimating the exit rate from the non-permanent position for young and long term 
unemployed workers are displayed in Table 6. In all cases we observe that: i) The duration 
dependence of the exit rate to a permanent contract is non linear since it starts increasing until 
the worker accumulates enough months in the non-permanent state. Interestingly, the exit rate of 
the young workers is always superior than the one of the long term unemployed
13; ii) There are 
significant differences in the exist rate by age and type of worker; iii) The exit rate reaches 
maximum levels at specific durations, mainly at 24 and 36 months; iv) The exit rate strongly 
depends on the previous labour path of the worker, specially on the number of temporary 
contracts, job interruptions and multi-firm experiences; v) There are several individual and job 
characteristics that strongly influence the exit rate to a permanent contract; vi) the unobserved 
heterogeneity term is relevant to explain the observed dispersion in the exit rate.   
We start off by highlighting the results relative to the unobserved heterogeneity component 
display in the last row of Table 6. To get a better understanding of the results we compute the 
duration dependence of estimated exit rate -measured at the average worker- by the unobserved 
heterogeneity component. They are displayed in Figures 3 and 4. These Figures put forward the 
evidence of the temporality trap for both, young and long term unemployed workers since once 
the worker has spent several months in the non-permanent state, the probability of getting a 
permanent contract starts decreasing. Moreover, the unobserved heterogeneity term points that 
there seem to be two types of workers faced with different chances to promote to stable jobs. 
Around 66% of young workers have a higher average exit rate –workers Type II-, 1.32% instead 
of the lower rate 0.25% faced by the rest of young workers. When we consider the long-term 
unemployed ones we obtain that the share of workers with a higher exit rate states at around 
60%. The differences between the exit rates of workers Type I and Type II are smaller since the 
exit rate is much lower for this group of workers. Concretely, it is 1.1% for workers Type II and 
0.1% for workers Type I. These large differences in the exit rate mean that the probability of 
getting a permanent contract for workers Type I are much lower independently of the duration 
at the non-permanent state.  
Given our model lacks of many individual and job characteristics we find it difficult to offer an 
economic meaning for the unobserved heterogeneity component. Previous empirical evidence 
                                           
12 We also test whether the duration dependence was different for each wage group and we did not find significant 
differences.  
13 These results match with those of Blanco and De la Rica (2002). They find that the exit rate from unemployment is 
lower for Long Term Unemployed older than 45 years. These differences in the exit rate are due to a lower arrival 
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tends to point out the variable education as a main determinant of the labour market 
segmentation. This variable is not available in our database and we proxy it with the wage 
group. Yet, it might be that this last variable does not correctly capture workers differences in 
attainment levels
14. Additionally, the unobserved heterogeneity term might be related to other 
non-observable characteristics such as ability or individual effort. 
Among the main determinants of the exit rate from the non-permanent position it stands out the 
workers age cohort. Figures 5 and 6 show the duration dependence of the exit rate from the non-
permanent position for workers Type II by age cohort
15. We obtain that, on average, younger 
workers face a lower probability of acceding into a permanent contract at the moment of 
entering into the labour market. Secondly, as the worker remains in the state of job instability, 
the exit rate grows faster for younger workers. Therefore, though the differences are small at the 
start of the non-permanent situation, they increase with its duration and from the second or third 
year, the exit rate is clearly higher for younger workers. On the other hand, the exit rate reaches 
the maximum at different durations and this maximum tends to arise earlier for older workers.  
These results match with the idea that temporary contracts favour the access of young workers 
into stable positions because as they stay in a temporary contract, they accumulate human 
capital and increase their productivity to compensate for the larger costs related to a permanent 
contract. The differences found between age cohorts might be related to differences in 
educational attainment levels
16. It is possible that young workers with high levels of formal 
education but with low labour market experience are in low paid jobs
17. These results might 
point out that for younger workers the labour market demands longer labour market experience 
to access to a permanent position. Other interesting results common to both samples are the 
local maximums in the exit rate found in the durations 12, 24 and 36. This points out that firms 
might wait until the end of the contract and exhaust all legal limits to convert temporary into 
permanent contracts. 
 
                                           
14 We find this argument especially relevant for young workers.  
15 We only display the results relative to workers Type II because the behavior of the exit rate for workers Type I has 
the same characteristics. 
16 Note that the variable used to measure the qualification of the worker is the wage group the worker belongs. 
17 This idea also matches with the fact that low and medium skills young workers face a larger probability of getting 
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6  Table 6: Exit Rate from the non-permanent position to a Permanent Contract (model with 
unobserved heterogeneity)  
  Young Workers  Long-Term Unemployed 
 Coeficient t-student  Coeficient  t-student 
Constant -5.434  -76.09  -5.919  -72.61 
Medium Skill (last contract)  0.214  3.66  0.178  3.96 
Low Skill (last contract) 0.176  3.42  0.334  10.35 
Woman   -0.256  -11.2  -0.187  -7.86 
Temporary Help Agency (last contract) 0.101  5.96  -0.357 -5.17 
Age Cohort 18-20  -0.071  -1.32  -  - 
Age Cohort 21-23  0.021  1.56  -  - 
Age Cohort 30-35  -  -  -0.171  -3.61 
Age Cohort 36-40  -  -  -0.166  -3.59 
Age Cohort 41-45  -  -  -0.231  -4.47 
Age Cohort 46-50  -  -  -0.033  -0.69 
Month 6  0.835  19.00  1.007  24.65 
Month 12  0.665  14.13  0.871  10.81 
Month 24  0.750  13.36  0.410  9.79 
Month 36  0.786  5.45  0.529  5.81 
Month 42  0.220  1.67  0.144  0.2 
Duration 0.079  21.15  0.071  22.18 
Duration^2 -0.001  -16.53  -0.001  -17.05 
Duration*Age Cohort 18-20  0.009  9.46  -  - 
Duration*Age Cohort 21-23  0.005  3.69  -  - 
Duration*Age Cohort 30-35  -  -  -0.003  -1.46 
Duration*Age Cohort 36-40  -  -  -0.008  -3.14 
Duration*Age Cohort 41-45  -  -  -0.003  -0.66 
Duration*Age Cohort 46-50  -  -  -0.017  -5.78 
Duration of the Unemployment Spells -0.032  -22.2  -0.054  -21.8 
Nº Temporary Contracts 2  -0.439 -0.51  -0.731  -17.57 
Nº Temporary Contracts 3  -0.541 -1.82  -1.029  -19.98 
Nº Temporary Contracts 4  -0.684 -2.32  -1.168  -19.84 
Nº Temporary Contracts 5  -0.746 -3.22  -1.406  -20.35 
Nº Temporary Contracts >=6 -1.042  -3.51  -1.552  -27.01 
Nº Unemployment Spells 1  -0.871  -3.27  -0.860  -22.27 
Nº Unemployment Spells 2  -1.083  -2.62  -0.876  -16.78 
Nº Unemployment Spells 3  -1.273  -2.61  -0.918  -13.83 
Nº Unemployment Spells 4  -1.634  -1.34  -1.431  -17.72 
Nº Firms 2  0.141  12.98  0.251  7.72 
Nº Firms 3  0.240  12.78  0.259  5.67 
Nº Firms 4  0.401  11.75  0.341  5.07 
Nº Firms 5  0.365  12.08  0.523  7.1 
Nº Activity Sectors 2  0.303  8.44  0.656  15.01 
Nº Activity Sectors 3  0.345  4.96  0.807  8.64 
T.c GDP /10  3.308  13.58  3.909  15.72 
Unemployment Rate /10 0.010  0.4  0.075  -5.22 
Construction -1.681  -14.8  -1.608  -17.39 
Cte Type1  -0.948  23.18  -1.805  35.32 
Prob. Type1  44.0%  -  40.3%  - 
Log (Likelihood Function)  -61624.8    -51371.901  
*Constant Term (Young Workers) : Men, 1 temporary contract, no unemployment experience, no firm mobility, no 
temporary help agency, no construction, high skill, cohort 24-26. 
*Constant Term (Long Term Unemployed Workers) : Men, 1 temporary contract, no unemployment experience, no 
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Now we wonder whether the characteristics of the workers labour path influence the exit rate to 
a permanent contract. That is, we analyse the incidence of the number of temporary contracts, 
multi-firm experiences and job interruptions on the exit rate towards a permanent position. We 
build six and four dummy variables to measure the effect of the first five temporary contracts 
and the first four unemployment experiences into the exit rate. Similarly, multi-firms 
experiences are described with four dummy variables. This specification is flexible since it 
captures any non-linearlities in the relation between the exit rate and the accumulation of 
temporary and unemployment spells and multi-firm and sector experiences. Specifically it 
allows measuring the marginal effect of each new temporary contract, firm, or unemployment 
spell into the exit rate. It is important to remind that they are all specified as time-varying 
variables.  
All the dummy variables related to the number of temporary contracts and unemployment 
experiences are negative and statistically significant. Hence, the probability of getting a 
permanent contract decreases with the number of temporary contracts and job interruptions for 
both samples. The dummy variables that control for multi-firm experiences are also statistically 
significant and positive. Therefore, we find that the effect of multi-firm do not seem to influence 
negatively into the exit rate to a permanent employment.  
In order to illustrate the effects of the characteristics of the labour market trajectory into the exit 
rate to a permanent employment we compute the exit rate from the model parameters at certain 
situations. We start displaying in Table 7 the estimated exit rate for a worker who has been 24 
months at the non-permanent state and in the same firm. We allow the exit rate varying as the 
workers accumulates different temporary contracts and unemployment spells. For instance, in 
the first column of Table 7 we describe the exit rate when the worker has been 24 months at the 
non-permanent state without unemployment experiences and each row represents the behaviour 
of the exit rate depending of the temporary contracts accumulated. Some interesting ideas arise 
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worker experience one temporary contract of 24 months. This exit rate decreases when the 
workers pass through several temporal contracts, though the duration at the non-permanent 
states remains the same. The largest drop takes place when the worker passes from the first to 
the second temporary contract experience. Thus, the exit rate goes from 6.26% to 4.48% for 
young workers and from 2.37% to 1.16% for long term unemployed ones. Therefore and 
assuming that the duration at the non-permanent position is the same, from the workers 
perspective it is better to get a temporary contract of larger duration than several temporary 
contracts of shorter duration. Secondly, the exit rate drops when the worker experience job 
interruptions. The largest drop takes place when the worker has the first job interruption. 
Afterwards, as the worker keeps entering into unemployment the exit rate decreases but at a 
lower rate. For instance, the exit rate for young workers moves down from 6.26% to 2.72% after 
having one unemployment spell. The same sequence takes place for the long-term unemployed 
but the differences are smaller since the exit rate is already much lower. Thirdly, the negative 
incidence of job interruptions into the exit rate to a permanent contract is much stronger than the 
accumulation of temporary contracts. Summarizing, for young and long-term unemployed 
workers the exit rate experiences the largest drop after the first temporary contract followed by 
an unemployment experience. 
7   Table 7: Exit Rate to a Permanent Employment by the Number of Temporary Contracts 
and Unemployment Spells 
  Nº of Unemployment Spells 
  Young Workers  Long-Term Unemployed Workers 
Nº T. C  0  1  2  3  4  0  1  2  3  4 
1  6.26% 2.72%  -  -    2.37% 1.02%  -  -  - 
2  4.48% 1.92% 1.56%  -    1.16% 0.49% 0.48%  -  - 
3  4.07% 1.75% 1.42% 1.18%  -  0.86% 0.37% 0.36% 0.35%  - 
4  3.62% 1.55% 1.26% 1.04% 0.73%  0.75% 0.32% 0.31% 0.30% 0.20% 
5  3.50% 1.50% 1.21% 1.01% 0.70%  0.59% 0.25% 0.25% 0.24% 0.16% 
6  2.70% 1.15% 0.93% 0.77% 0.54%  0.51% 0.22% 0.21% 0.20% 0.14% 
 
Equivalently, we can analyse the behaviour of the exit rate to a permanent employment as the 
number of temporary contracts and firm experiences increases. In this case we compute the exit 
rate under the assumption that the worker does not experience job interruptions. These results 
are presented in Table 8. It is interesting to note that the exit rate of a worker who stays at the 
same firm accumulating temporary contracts is lower that the exit rate when she accumulates 
temporary contract and simultaneously changes firm.  For instance, the exit rate of a young 
worker who has experience three temporary contracts at the same firm is 4.07%. Meanwhile, 
this exit rate when the worker has moved to other firms at each temporary contract is 5.13%. 
This result holds for young and long-term unemployed workers. Though in the case of young 
workers the exit rate starts decreasing when the worker has four multi-firm experiences. This 
result does not show up for the case of long term unemployed workers. Therefore we find that 
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contract
18.    
8  Table 8: Exit Rate to a Permanent Employment by the Number of Temporary Contracts 
and Multi-firm Experiences 
 Multi-firm  Experiences 
  Young Workers  Long-Term Unemployed Workers 
Nº T. C.   0 1 2  3  4  0  1 2 3 4 
1  6.26% -  -  -  -  1.95%  -  -  -  - 
2  4.48% 5.12%  -  -  -  0.95%  1.21%  -  -  - 
3  4.07% 4.66% 5.13%  -  -  0.70%  0.90% 0.91%  -  - 
4  3.62% 4.15% 4.56%  5.31%  -  0.61% 0.79% 0.79% 0.86%  - 
5  3.50% 4.01% 4.41%  5.14%  4.97%  0.48% 0.62% 0.63% 0.68%  0.81% 
6  2.70% 3.10% 3.41%  3.98%  3.84%  0.42% 0.54% 0.54% 0.59%  0.71% 
 
In Table 9 we compare the incidence of the duration of the unemployment spell with the number 
of spells on the exit rate to a permanent contract. When we focus on the case of young workers 
we can observe that to explain the decreasing trend of the exit rate the duration of the 
unemployment experience is less relevant than the job interruption itself. In the case of long-
term unemployment workers these results are less clear since the exit rate is much lower and 
there are not significant differences between the exit rate as the duration of the unemployment 
spell increases and the exit rate when there are job interruptions. It seems that for this group of 
workers the duration of the spell of unemployment is as important as the number of job 
interruptions
19.  
The results shows that while one single temporary experience is helpful, repeated temporary 
contract experiences may instead have a detrimental effect on the conquer for a stable job. From 
the results just presented we conclude that the optimal strategy to access to a permanent contract 
is to pass though few temporary contracts of long duration and with no job interruptions. 
Nevertheless, when the worker needs to accumulate temporary contracts it is better to change 
firms.  
                                           
18 Since the average number of multi-firm experiences is one and the percentile 75 is two we do not find relevant to 
specify more than four dummies. 
19 In fact we have computed the exit rate for workers type II and we found that the exit rate decreases at a faster rate 
when the duration of the unemployment spell increases than when the workers accumulate new unemployment 
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9  Table 9: Estimated Exit Rate to a Permanent Employment by the Duration of the Spell of 
Unemployment (months) 
  Number of Spells of Unemployment 
  Young Workers  Long-Term Unemployed 
Unemployment 
Duration  1 2  1 2 
1 2.64%  -  0.23%  - 
2 2.56%  1.51%  0.21%  0.21% 
3 2.48%  1.47%  0.20%  0.20% 
4 2.40%  1.42%  0.19%  0.19% 
5 2.33%  1.38%  0.18%  0.18% 
6 2.26%  1.34%  0.17%  0.17% 
7 2.19%  1.29%  0.16%  0.16% 
8 2.12%  1.25%  0.15%  0.15% 
9 2.06%  1.21%  0.15%  0.14% 
 
VI Summary  and  Conclusions 
After two decades of strong segmentation of the Spanish labour Market, there exists general 
agreement that the presence of temporary contracts must be limited. This consensus has upheld 
the labour market reforms that began during the 90s and which are still present in the political 
economic agenda. Yet, the current state of the Spanish labour market is still characterised by 
high levels of temporary contracts and there are not clear signs of any changing since the share 
of new contracts with a temporary nature is still too high, around 80%.  
A fundamental issue related to this high rate of temporality is the probability that workers enter 
into the temporality trap. That is to say, a labor market path characterised by ongoing 
movements between temporary contracts and job interruptions and with low prospects of 
finding a stable position. This phenomenon has strong negative consequences on the workers 
expected future rents since job instability is also related to low paid jobs what directly also 
affects unemployment compensations and retirement. Consequently, we find important to study 
whether the flexiblisation of the labor market through the extensive use of temporary contracts 
favour the existence of the temporality trap and to analyse what are the main determinants of 
this phenomenon from the perspective of the social well-being and the public policy. We 
already know that the excessive level of job turnover might have negative consequences on the 
productivity level and therefore to offset the positives effects of the temporary contracts in terms 
of efficiency.  
One of the main aims of this study is to show whether the duration of the temporary situation, 
the number of temporary contracts, unemployment spells and multi-firm experiences help 
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temporary workers using a database taken from the social security records for the period 1995-
2004. Since we want to avoid the initial conditions problem, we analyse two specific types of 
workers: young workers and long term unemployed who enter into the labour market through a 
temporary contract. We estimate the exit rate from a non-permanent position to an indefinite 
contract controlling for observed and unobserved heterogeneity.  
The statistical section showed that the transition rate to a permanent contract is pretty low. 
However this situation can arise because the worker needs to accumulate several temporary 
contracts to get a permanent one. The idea is that the worker has to increase her general and 
specific human capital skills because the firm will be willing to convert her temporary contract 
into a permanent one once her labour productivity offset the higher labour costs associated to a 
permanent contract.  
The evidence showed provides information to the extent whether temporary contracts are good 
or bad for workers labour career. We obtain that the average duration before getting a 
permanent contract is enough high in Spain. The exit rate from the non-permanent position is 
low and it reaches a maximum for durations larger than three years. Nevertheless, this average 
result hinder significant differences between workers depending on observed, mainly age 
cohort, and unobserved characteristics. Specifically, the unobserved heterogeneity term shows 
that temporary contracts might impose an important penalty on the labour path of certain type of 
workers, independently of their observed characteristics such as age or gender, and 
independently of the duration at the non-permanent state. This group represents around the 44% 
and 40% for young and long-term unemployed workers, respectively.   
Our results also ratify the fact that high job turnover rates have negative consequences on the 
probability of getting stable labour positions. We obtain that this probability notably decreases 
when the worker passes through several temporary contracts and unemployment experiences. 
On the contrary, in relation to multi-firm experiences we do not find evidence of a negative 
impact, at least for the first four firm movements. We also wonder whether the duration of the 
unemployment spell is more important than the number of job interruptions and we conclude 
that job interruptions have a stronger impact on the exit rate for young workers. Whereas, the 
opposite result is observed for long-term unemployed.  
These results point to some characteristics of the hiring decision process of Spanish firms and 
question the temporary nature of the jobs covered with temporary contracts. In one hand, it 
seems that some Spanish firms support the use of temporary contracts as almost exclusive 
instrument to obtain the external and internal flexibility and even with the negative cost that the 
excessive labour rotation has on productivity. Those workers who establish a labor relation with 
this type of firms can get trapped into the temporality state. This obstructs the accumulation of 
specific human capital since as it is known, the incentives of the businessmen and workers to 
investing in formation and experience depend positively on the expected duration of the labour 
relation. On the other hand, we also find that some firms use temporary contracts as an 
screening device since one temporary contract of 6-12 months is enough to find out whether the 
firm has found a good match. Nevertheless, other firms exhaust legal limits to convert the 
temporary contract into a permanent one and therefore labour institutions influence the duration 
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The important policy conclusion from this research is that the expansion of temporary work, as 
a way of increasing labour market flexibility, comes at a cost. From the economic policy point 
of view, the main issue should not be the existence of temporary contracts itself but their 
penalty effects on the workers labour path when temporary contracts are joined to high turnover 
rates. This notably hinders the chances to acquire general and specific human capital skills and 
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